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ABSTRACT
This is a case study of asset specific investments, a class of
transactions that is well understood in the context of economic
theory but that is under-analyzed empirically. Because specific
investments are particular to a single location, use or customer,
their next best use is of much lower value than the use for which
they are initially intended. Consequently, asset specific invest-
ments face the threat of ex post opportunism and allocative inef-
ficiency. This contracting problem is particularly difficult when
firms that are otherwise rivals must coordinate individual in-
vestments to create a shared resource. In such cases, generat-
ing credible expectations of cooperation among rivals is critical
to coordinating these investments. The case of@Home Corpora-
tion is an example of how rival cable companies were able to
employ "hybrid" structures including contractual safeguards
like joint ownership, specialized governance devices and eco-
nomic lock-in to overcome the problem of asset specificity and
then build out a nationwide cable-based online service network
during the 1990s. As the market subsequently developed alter-
natives to @Home, the economic lock-in required to induce coop-
eration failed to materialize, and @Home collapsed. The
ultimate failure of @Home points out that those strategies that
provide the proper ex ante incentives many not always be dura-
ble, leaving contracting parties with less than perfect options.
1. Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Thanks to Mike
Klausner for his comments on early drafts of this paper as well as Ron Gilson for his
insights and perspective on "deals" like this one. Thanks also to Elizabeth D. John-
ston (BCLS. '11) for valuable editorial assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While broadband Internet access seems commonplace today, dur-
ing the mid-1990s the technology required to support the develop-
ment of high-speed residential Internet access was still nascent.
Before service providers could introduce such technology nationwide,
proponents of a broadband vision had to overcome a series of techni-
cal and economic challenges, not the least of which involved coordi-
nating large investments in dedicated infrastructure capable of
supporting such a network. This article is a case study of how the
largest cable companies in the United States used contract and trans-
action structures to overcome these challenges and build the first na-
tionwide high-speed network.
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@Home Corporation ("@Home") was founded in 1995 by Tele
Communications, Inc. ("TCI") with the goal of bringing cable-based
Internet access to the public. TCI later brought in cable company
rivals Cox Communications, Inc. ("Cox") and Comcast Corporation
("Comcast") as minority shareholders in @Home and ultimately sold
shares in the venture to the public.2 The cable company rivals relied
on a series of contractual devices to overcome the challenge of coordi-
nating each of the investments required to make the nationwide,
cable-based network a reality.
Within a few short years, the structure of this transaction al-
lowed the cable companies to cooperate and build a broadband net-
work. By 2001, @Home boasted more than 4.1 million subscribers
and 45% of the residential broadband market. 3 By almost any tech-
nical measure, the @Home network was a success. Notwithstanding
this technical success, ultimately, the firm collapsed financially.
An asset specific investment has two traits: first, the investment
is made in advance of an anticipated exchange with a counterparty;
and second, the assets created have value in a particular location,
use, or counterparty's hands, such that the assets' next best use is of
much lower value than the use for which they are initially intended.
4
Challenges created by asset specific investments have attracted the
interest of many economists and legal scholars. 5 In particular, schol-
ars have been interested in the threat of strategic behavior (i.e., op-
portunism) as a potential deterrent to socially valuable specific
investments. In the absence of contractual protections, after a party
2. Venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers was also an early mi-
nority shareholder. At Home Corp., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-V/A)
(June 20, 1997).
3. At Home Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 6 (May 16, 1997). See
also Rachel Konrad et al., Family Feud: Excite@Home, AT&T: A Case Study in Boar-
droom Politics, NEWS.coM, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://news.cnet.com/2009-
1033-846668.html; Todd Wallack, Who Killed Excite@Home, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17,
2001 at E-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ca/200l/12/17/
BU23049.DTL.
4. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 522 (1983).
5. The problem of asset specificity has been the subject of a number of important
works in the area of transaction cost economics. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 4;
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Benjamin Klein & K.B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual, Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
(1981); Paul L. Joskow, Contact Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Em-
pirical Evidence from Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168 (1987); Victor P. Goldberg
& John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case
Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987).
Spring 20101
HeinOnline  -- 15 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 79 2010
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
has made a specific investment (e.g., a pipeline), the counterparty can
extract virtually all the surplus that the specific investment might
yield through an opportunistic negotiation over access to the comple-
mentary asset (e.g., crude oil from the counterparty's well).6 In light
of the potential for opportunistic behavior by a counterparty, it is nec-
essary for a party making specific investments to protect its interest
through ex ante contractual arrangements or transaction structures.
Otherwise, that party will not make the investment in the first place,
and jointly valuable assets will not be created.
When parties must make joint investments in specific assets
such as a broadband network, there are additional opportunities and
challenges. If parties can successfully coordinate their investments,
then they can share in joint gains. However, the joint gains available
in this type of network investment are contingent on all parties coop-
erating. If any party defects, joint gains may fail to materialize. At
the same time, each party to a network investment has an incentive
to shirk, thereby generating smaller societal gains and then free-rid-
ing off the joint investments of others. As a result, the equilibrium
outcome in such situations is that no party cooperates. Unless par-
ties, especially rivals, can create credible expectations that they will
cooperate, they may be unable to successfully coordinate the required
joint investments.
7
Where contracting and vertical integration are unable to reduce
ex post incentives for opportunism and generate an expectation of co-
operation, parties may rely on hybrid forms.8 Hybrid forms are char-
acterized by three traits. First, they involve pooled resources or joint
assets, sometimes among rivals.9 Second, parties to hybrid forms
usually rely on relational contracting, such as long-term contracts
6. Goldberg and Erickson explore this tension in the context of coordinating in-
vestments in petroleum coke calciners. See Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 5, at
375.
7. This type of coordination problem is known as a "stag hunt." Lewis summa-
rizes the stag hunt problem in the following manner: "Suppose we are in a wilderness
without food. Separately we can catch rabbits and eat badly. Together we can catch
stags and eat well. But if even one of use deserts the stag hunt to catch a rabbit, the
stag will get away; so the other stag hunters will not eat unless they desert too."
DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STuDY 7 (1969). For a lengthy discus-
sion of the stag hunt, see BRIAN SKYRMS, THE STAG HuNT AND THE EvoLuTION OF SO-
CiAL STRucTURE (2004).
8. Hybrid forms of organization are distinct from either market contracting or
vertical integration. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization:
The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 271 (1991).
9. Claude M~nard, A New Institutional Approach to Organization, in HANDBOOK
OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 281, 294-302 (Claude M~nard & Mary M. Shirley
eds., 2005).
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with specialized governance arrangements, to secure the cooperation
of rivals.' 0 Third, though parties in hybrid forms will typically coop-
erate in the area of concern to the hybrid, they continue to compete
against one another in other areas. 1
This article analyzes how the founders of @Home responded to
the problem of asset specificity and the need to coordinate specific
investments among rival cable companies by creating a hybrid trans-
actional structure. This structure included joint ownership, special-
ized governance arrangements, and an economic lock-in strategy. It
tied rival cable companies together and created credible expectations
of cooperation, thereby inducing the rival companies to make the spe-
cific investments required to build the @Home network. However,
when industry conditions later changed, the switching costs for both
consumers and each of the cable companies declined dramatically.
As a result, the cable companies found it unnecessary to continue
their cooperation. Each subsequently replicated the functions of the
@Home network independently, and @Home failed.
The rise and fall of @Home provides unique examples of both the
methods of contracting in order to coordinate asset specific invest-
ments and the vulnerability of such methods. In its ascent, @Home's
story demonstrates how rival parties can employ a combination of
contractual safeguards and economic lock-in to create incentives for
each of them to make asset specific investments in a joint enterprise.
The collapse of @Home, however, illustrates that such strategies also
have inherent weaknesses. Subsequent to the initial investment,
changes in market conditions lowered the switching costs associated
with substitutes for the @Home service. As these costs fell to near
zero, @Home's reliance on economic lock-in to tie the parties together
proved ineffective.
This article is laid out in six sections. Section 1 describes the
concepts of asset specificity and opportunism as well as the contrac-
tual safeguards that can be employed to address these issues. Sec-
tion 2 provides background on the formation of the @Home
Corporation, including some of the commercial and economic chal-
lenges to building out the @Home network in the mid to late 1990s.
Section 3 describes the devices that @Home and its investors used to
10. Id.
11. Id. at 294-302. MasterCard is an example of an organizational form where
parties both cooperate and compete within the framework of the hybrid structure. See
DAVID S. EVANs AND & RicHARD M. SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 155-58 (2005).
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respond to the particular asset specificity challenges they faced. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 describe the exogenous changes in the industry that
lowered the switching costs for @Home's cable company partners that
led to the collapse of the firm. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
II. ASSET SPECIFICITY AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES
Asset specific investments exhibit two important traits: first,
costs are incurred in advance of the anticipated exchange; second, the
assets are particular to a single location, use, or customer, such that
their next best use is of much lower value than their anticipated
use.12 An oil pipeline connecting an oil well to a refinery is the classic
example of a specific asset.' 3 The pipeline must be built prior to, or
at least in conjunction with, the development of the oil well, and it is
located in a particular place - between the well-head and the refin-
ery; it has a single, highly specialized use - transporting oil from the
well-head to the refinery; and it is dedicated for the use of a particu-
lar customer or supplier - the refinery and well-head. Because of the
specific nature of a pipeline, the party that has invested in it is vul-
nerable to ex post opportunism by the owner of the field to which the
particular pipeline is dedicated. For example, if after a pipeline is
installed the oil well owner were to decline to send its oil through it,
the pipeline's value would be significantly diminished. If the well
owner's threat to withhold oil is credible, then the pipeline owner has
little choice but to accept transport fees that can all but eliminate the
returns it otherwise would have earned from transporting the oil. In
this manner, the owner of a non-specific asset can "hold-up" the
owner of a specific asset and retain the lion's share of the surplus for
itself.14
In the absence of asset specificity, parties can rely on low switch-
ing costs and the threat of market competition to constrain potential
ex post opportunism. For example, if the pipeline were capable of
12. Williamson, supra note 4, at 522. Specific assets are divided into four sub-
groups: site specificity, physical asset specificity, dedicated assets, and human asset
specificity. Site specificity relates to the particular geographic location of assets.
Physical asset specificity relates to the highly specialized use of individual assets.
Dedicated assets relates to new capacity for designated customers, without whom the
capacity is excessive. Human asset specificity relates to job specific skills that em-
ployees develop over time that will have little or no use elsewhere. See OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 59-60, 105-106 (1996).
13. Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Com-
petitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 310-13 (1978).
14. For a discussion of the "hold-up" problem, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAw & ECONOMICS 263 (2000).
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serving multiple well owners, then the threat by any single well
owner to withhold crude oil from a pipeline would be inconsequential.
In the event that one well owner declined to use the pipeline, the
pipeline owner would simply replace that well's crude with supplies
from another well. Thus, when switching costs are low, the threat of
competition can deter the well owner from attempting to hold up the
pipeline owner.
Asset specificity may also have temporal aspects. Certain assets,
when viewed prospectively, may appear to be specific; but, after the
passage of time and changes in market conditions, the same assets
may lose part or all of their specificity. 15 Take, for example, a pipe-
line built to connect a single oil well to a market. The pipeline is
specific to the well. If other wells are discovered along the route of
the pipeline, the pipeline may lose some or all of its specific nature as
it becomes able to serve the new wells. Consequently, assets that are
specific in the short term may lose their specific nature over time as
market conditions change.
Where assets are specific, alternative uses are much less valua-
ble than the original uses for which the assets were intended. As a
result, if a would-be investor in a specific asset expects to be vulnera-
ble to an ex post hold-up, he may decline to make the investment.
Alternatively, the prospect of an ex post hold-up may lead the owner
of the specific asset to over-invest in hedging against a potential hold-
up.16 For example, a pipeline owner may design a longer-than-neces-
sary pipeline that traverses many fields to hedge against a potential
hold-up by well owners in any single field. Unless parties are able to
address the possibility of an ex post hold-up prior to making an asset
15. Masten et al. use the term "temporal asset specificity" to describe economic
lock-in. Scott E. Masten et al., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 1, 9
(1991).
16. Klein et al., supra note 13, at 311. It is not uncommon for commercial air-
lines, which have to make significant specific investments in support facilities, per-
sonnel, and training, to spread their aircraft purchases between Boeing and Airbus
even though it would be more economical for them to consolidate all their purchases
with a single supplier. Commercial airlines make multiple specific investments to
avoid being held-up by any single supplier of aircraft. This is clearly a second-best
solution since the airline would be better off by economizing on its specific invest-
ments in personnel and support facilities. The aircraft manufacturer might also be
better off if it could credibly commit not to engage in ex post opportunism. Making
those manufacturer's commitments credible is a contracting challenge, which the air-
line hedges by over-investing in specific assets using the threat to switch aircraft sup-
pliers at the margin to forestall opportunistic behavior. See also Joseph Farrell &
Nancy T. Gallini, Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract
Competition, 103 Q.J. ECON. 673 (1988) (describing how parties can use second sourc-
ing - building in excess supplier capacity - to avoid hold-up problems).
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specific investment, they may miss opportunities for joint gains, and
resources could thus be allocated inefficiently from a societal point of
view.
17
There are several potential responses to the challenges posed by
specific assets. The object of each response is to create cooperation
between the parties for long enough to permit the parties to earn a
sufficient return on their investments. In a highly stylized world, the
best response is a perfectly specified contract addressing all possible
ex post opportunities, thus providing parties the assurance needed
for them to enter into the required long-term relationship.' 8 Where,
as in the real world, contracting and enforcement costs of such a con-
tract can be prohibitive, vertical integration of the parties is an alter-
native solution to the challenges of asset specificity.' 9 In addition to
vertical integration or state-contingent contracting there are other
contractual responses and economic structures that can adequately
address the risk of opportunism.
A. Vertical Integration
When the costs of contracting and enforcement are high relative
to the costs of integrating, vertical integration is the best response.
Vertical integration entails the consolidation of a specific asset and
the activity that utilizes the asset within a single firm to internalize
the incentives for ex post opportunism. 20 For example, a power plant
located at the mouth of a coal mine is extremely vulnerable to the
threat of opportunism by the coal mine owner (especially if the coal
mine owner has other potential buyers for its coal). The cost of speci-
fying and then enforcing a long-term supply contract can be very
high. Consequently, it is common for power plants that are adjacent
to coal mines to have the same owners. 2' Common ownership of both
17. Klein et al., supra note 13, at 298.
18. Williamson notes it is understood that such complete contracts are impossi-
bly complex to write and are thus invariably incomplete. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 333 (1985).
19. Klein et al. argue that the relative size of"appropriable quasi rents" increases
as the costs of contracting increase. Where those rents are high, a cost minimizing
solution is vertical integration. Where those rents are low, market contracting can
sufficiently protect against opportunism. See Klein, et al., supra note 13, at 299.
20. Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 112 (1971).
21. See Joskow, supra note 5. Spot market transactions for coal are unlikely to
be competitive alternatives for power plant owners. Mine-mouth coal plants are situ-
ated next to coal mines with low energy value coal. This coal has a relatively high
weight to energy ratio, making it expensive transport long distances. In order for the
power supplied by these plants to be competitive, the plants must be located in very
[Vol. 15:77
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the mine and the plant reduces contracting costs and eliminates the
possibility of the coal mine owner holding up the power plant owner.
With vertical integration, the single owner of both assets receives the
full surplus and the issue of ex post hold-up vanishes.
B. Joint Ownership
Joint ownership shares some characteristics of vertical integra-
tion but is more likely to occur in a special circumstance: when hori-
zontal rivals must share access to a complementary specific asset,
like a network or a pipeline. With joint ownership, horizontal rivals
create a new, jointly-owned entity that invests in, owns, and manages
the shared specific asset.
To illustrate, recall the example of the pipeline and the oil well.
If one oil well owner vertically integrates and builds a pipeline con-
necting all the oil fields in a particular area to the refinery, that
owner might be in a position to use his control over the pipeline to
extract rents from other oil-well owners who need to use the pipe-
line. 22 The threat of a hold-up by the vertically integrated rival
would deter investment in wells in the area or it would lead them to
make inefficient investments in excess pipeline capacity so as to
avoid a hold-up. With joint ownership of a pipeline, however, rival
owners can reduce the likelihood of a hold-up, reduce excess pipeline
capacity, and ensure that capacity is available to all well owners. In
this respect, joint ownership of complementary assets permits rivals
to reduce the opportunity for a hold-up and find limited areas of
cooperation.
23
Joint ownership is necessarily incomplete, however, in that it
does not address issues related to rivalry and opportunistic behavior
close proximity to the mine that supplies the coal. Thus, mine mouth plants exhibit
all the characteristics of asset specificity described by Williamson: location, use, and
customer.
22. It should not be surprising to learn that pipelines are often owned jointly by
the rival oil-wells for precisely this reason. See Klein et al., supra note 13, at 299.
23. This is particularly true when the complementary asset has characteristics of
a network. See MasterCard Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 5 (Sept. 15,
2003). Until the recent IPO, MasterCard was owned by a consortium of the rival
banks that issued credit cards. See also Iridium World Commc'n Registration State-
ment (Form S-1), at 49 (Mar. 17, 1997). Iridium, a global satellite telephone service
provider, was owned by a consortium of the variety of telephone companies that con-
nected the system with subscribers.
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among well owners at the level of the jointly-owned entity's opera-
tions and distribution of the entity's profits. 24 These issues must be
addressed by contract among the co-owners. To this end, joint owner-
ship is typically combined with a long-term contract, either in the
organic documentation of the jointly-owned entity or by separate
agreement between the entity and the owners, or both.
C. Long-Term Supply Contracts
Where specific investments are required but the contracting
costs are not as high as in the previous cases, parties can overcome
hold-up threats by using long-term supply contracts. 25 In a long-
term supply contract, the party that is not investing in a specific as-
set commits to long-term purchases of the service or good from the
party making a specific investment. Legally enforceable long-term
commitments can provide the party making the specific investment
with certainty against the possibility of ex post opportunism. 26 For
example, a pipeline owner could enter into a long-term transporta-
tion contract with an oil well owner prior to building the pipeline.
This would assure the pipeline owner of a steady revenue stream for
many years. Of course, a legally enforceable long-term commitment
does not eliminate the threat of opportunism by oil well owners at the
point of renegotiation many years in the future. It can, however, pro-
vide the owner of the pipeline a sufficient number of years over which
it can earn an acceptable return on its investment.27
Because long-term supply contracts lock parties into a relation-
ship, they must also be sufficiently flexible to manage unanticipated
developments that may arise over the course of the contract. The
sheer number of contingencies over the life of a long-term contract
makes full specification of long-term contracts an impossible task.
This problem is even more complicated in industries where technol-
ogy is changing rapidly. 28 In industries characterized by specific in-
vestments in rapidly developing technology, even extremely flexible
24. These issues include agency problems as between majority and minority
stockholders in a joint venture of the like described in Randall Morck et al., Corporate
Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth, 43 J. EcoN. LIT. 655 (2005).
25. Williamson, supra note 20; Klein et al., supra note 13.
26. A long-term contract will not reduce the incentive for a hold-up at the point of
renegotiation. However, if the contract is sufficiently long, the owner of the specific
asset is able to amortize the cost of its investment over time and thus may be more
amenable to a redistribution of the surplus at a later stage.
27. Williamson, supra note 20, at 116.
28. Long-term contracts are rare in businesses that are undergoing rapid techno-
logical development. Id.
[Vol. 15:77
HeinOnline  -- 15 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 86 2010
@Home - Asset Specificity
long-term arrangements may not be suitable. As such, unless parties
can manage the incompleteness of these contracts, they leave them-
selves open to opportunistic behavior in mid-stream negotiations. 2
9
Long-term supply contracts manage incompleteness of informa-
tion in three ways. First, they may define and allocate purchase and
sale obligations among the parties. Second, with or without purchase
and sale obligations, they may provide a mechanism that creates in-
centives for cooperation and constrains opportunism. Third, they cre-
ate dispute resolution mechanisms that can resolve disagreements
among the parties.
3 0
D. Price and Quantity Adjustments
When entering into a long-term supply contract, it is difficult to
specify in advance the prices and quantities that will be required over
time. Therefore, parties must create a credible mechanism for deter-
mining these values. 3 ' Where there is a market for the good or ser-
vice that is the subject of the contract, the parties can usually refer to
the market price to set future prices. If there is no such market, par-
ties can specify future price adjustments through a variety of mecha-
nisms including indexing, pricing formulas, and commission
pricing.
32
Indexing is an easy-to-implement, though imperfect, device. In-
dexing has the benefit of ensuring that prices in a long-term contract
reflect changes in some set of market prices. However, to the extent
the index relied upon does not perfectly correlate with the subject of
the contract, index pricing may be inefficient.
33
One alternative to indexing is commission pricing. In a commis-
sion pricing scheme, the contract price is specified as a percentage of
the counterparty's sale price. This has the benefit of both permitting
the price to be flexible over time and economizing on pre-contract
29. In the classic example of ex post opportunism, Fisher Body-General Motors,
GM fell victim to moral hazard when Fisher Body began to game with the pricing
formula to extract rents from GM. See Klein et al., supra note 13, at 308-10; see also
Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-
General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988).
30. Long-term agreements are not appropriate in every circumstance, however.
For example, writing long-term contracts where technology at the core of the agree-
ment is changing or unproven can be especially difficult, if not impossible. William-
son, supra note 20, at 115-16.
31. Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 527, 527-28 (1985); Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 5, at 370-71.
32. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 534; Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 5, at 382-
83.
33. Goldberg and Erickson, supra note 5, at 382-83.
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search costs. 34 Commission pricing is easier to arrange and police if
the counterparty acts only as a broker.35 If, however, the broker adds
value before resale or offers complementary services by incorporating
the product into another product, the process of setting internal
prices may become more complicated. The more a broker integrates
the particular product into other products that the broker offers, the
greater the potential for disputes regarding appropriate compensa-
tion increases and the less attractive commission pricing becomes as
a method for resolving the problem of price adjustment over time.
36
E. Safeguards
Parties can bolster their confidence in long-term contracts by in-
cluding safeguards. 37 Contracting with safeguards entails the use of
incentives to constrain opportunism and give parties confidence that
they will be able to amortize their specific investments over time.38
Contractual safeguards alter ex post incentives by raising the
cost of opportunistic behavior.39 This goal can be achieved through
the exchange of "hostages," or items with value to the parties. As in
the days when warring kings exchanged princes or princesses to
guarantee peace commitments, the presence of a metaphorical hos-
tage can create incentives for the party not making the specific in-
vestment to credibly commit to cooperation rather than
opportunism.
40
In the context of a contract, hostages can take the form of forfeit-
able bonds, termination fees, liquidated damages, or other cancella-
tion penalties triggered by opportunistic defaults. 41 By incorporating
explicit hostage costs into a contract where one party must make a
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Goldberg and Erickson note that in the case of coke, when the reseller simply
acts as middleman, arranging for contracts and reshipping, then tracking the proper
commission level is a simple task. On the other hand, when the reseller begins to
hold inventory, mix coke from various sellers, or reprocess the coke before reselling it,
then determining an appropriate percentage to assign as commission before more is
troublesome. Id.
37. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 32-35
(1985) (analyzing the important role of protective safeguards in contracting).
38. Id. at 140.
39. Axelrod showed that raising the costs of defection in the Prisoners' Dilemma
game relative to the benefits of defecting - thereby changing the structure of the
payoffs - can dissuade defection. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERA-
TION 133 (1984).
40. Williamson, supra note 4, at 537.
41. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 135-36 (1960). Hostages
need not always take the form of cash. In some circumstances, they could take the
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specific investment, parties are able to impose a cost on opportunistic
behavior and thereby promote cooperation. For example, if an oil
well owner were required to post a significant default bond with a
third party, he would be more likely to continue providing oil to the
pipeline, and, to the extent price or quantity terms turn out to be
incomplete, to cooperate in revising terms in the event they stray too
far.
Parties can also reduce incentives for opportunism by creating
economic lock-in, a variation of the hostage strategy that does not
rely on an explicit contractual penalty for defecting. Economic lock-in
occurs when the economics of a deal are such that the parties, once
engaged with one another, expect to find cooperation more attractive
than non-cooperation. Economic lock-in can be created by mutual as-
set specific investments or joint efforts that are expected to yield a
product or business that is too valuable to abandon. By creating eco-
nomic dependence, as opposed to a contractual obligation, lock-in
raises the switching costs of the party likely to defect.
42
For example, during the mid-1990s, AOL used the concept of eco-
nomic lock-in to keep some of its customers from defecting. AOL
made a series of asset specific investments in its network. At the
same time, customers had a choice of a number of competing proprie-
tary networks. Presumably, subscribers could have switched online
service providers at relatively little cost to themselves. However,
AOL was able to raise switching costs and lock in retail subscribers
through the use of subscriber e-mail accounts. Because e-mail ac-
counts were tied to the network (i.e., @aol.com), switching away from
the AOL network created costs for retail subscribers and dissuaded
them from leaving. 43 Locking in subscribers ensured AOL a long-
term stream of revenues and at least initially allowed it to amortize
its specific investments in its network.
form of an important license granted automatically upon the existence of some condi-
tion or default. See Farrell & Gallini, supra note 16, at 673-74.
42. At the same time, once locked in, the balance of power in a relationship shifts.
To reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, parties can also rely on joint own-
ership of assets where there is a strong potential for lock-in. Henry Hansmann, Own-
ership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON & ORG. 267, 279 (1988).
43. The key insight is that customers will not switch away until the benefits of
switching away exceed the costs of doing so. By raising the marginal costs of switch-
ing away, a seller can deter customers from switching. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R.
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 109-10
(1999).
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III. @HOME DEAL BACKGROUND
Though the Internet has become a central feature in economic
life today, it was still nascent in the 1990s. At that time, the Internet
was plagued with congestion and reliability problems. In addition, in
the mid-1990s the Internet was not yet synonymous with the World
Wide Web; rather, it was an amalgamation of different network com-
munication protocols, among them Gopher, Telnet, SMTP, and IRC
HTTP/HTML. Because of this, the Internet could be difficult to
search and navigate. 44 The first browser, Mozilla (later Netscape),
was not released until late 1994, while Internet Explorer was not re-
leased until the middle of 1995.
4 5
Not surprisingly, part of the consumer appeal of online service
providers like AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy was their ease of use
for consumers who were not technically-oriented. Online service
providers, therefore, focused on developing proprietary networks and
content to serve specifically these consumers. 46 These services pro-
vided important intermediation functions by selecting, organizing,
and presenting information and content to subscribers. AOL, the in-
dustry leader, could be easily accessed by unsophisticated consumers
using proprietary software and a telephone modem. AOL offered
subscribers exclusive access to a wide variety of content.47 With the
exception of Internet access, all of AOL's content was on its proprie-
tary network so that once a subscriber logged into the network, the
only constraint to accessing content was the speed of the subscriber's
telephone modem. AOL's strategy of supplying content on a
proprietary network along with the means for easy navigation was
44. Though AOL permitted members to access the Internet, the lack of a useful
browser limited subscribers' ability to explore the web. During the middle of the
1990s, Internet access was still considered "risky." For example, AOL's terms of ser-
vice at this time included a disclaimer that members accessing the Internet "did so at
[their] own risk." See William W. Burrington, Cable Online Services, 437 PLI/PAT
387, March 1996.
45. Netscape Communications, Registration Statement (Form S-i) (June 23,
1995); JONATHAN E. NEUCHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS 127
(2005).
46. America Online, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (September 30, 1996). In
the mid-1990s, Microsoft's MSN network adopted the same online services business-
model: online content walled off from the Internet and available only to subscribers.
See Paul Thurrott, MSN: The Inside Story, May 19, 2005, http://www.winsupersite.
com/showcase/msn inside_01.asp.
47. See generally AOL Inc., AOL Timeline, http://corp.aol.com/content/aol-time-
line (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (giving examples of services introduced by AOL at
various points).
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successful. AOL's customer base grew rapidly during the mid-1990s,
going from 1 million customers in 1995 to 5 million in 1996.48
In March 1995, TCI, the largest cable company in the United
States at the time, formed @Home. 49 @Home planned to use new
cable technologies to provide online services at speeds much faster
than were previously available to consumers. 50 While the telephone
modems used by subscribers of online services could transfer data at
speeds of only 14-56 kbps, TCI planned to create a cable-based online
service that would leverage cable's higher capacity and permit high-
speed transmission to retail subscribers at speeds of 2 to 5 mbps,
more than 100 times faster than a 28.8 kbps telephone modem.51 A
relatively new technology called hybrid fiber/coaxial cable ("HFC")
made this possible. HFC allowed high-speed, two-way transmission
of data and video into and out of households. 52 On @Home's network,
subscribers would establish an "always on" connection with the net-
work using their cable television connections and a cable modem,
thereby avoiding busy signals and other nuisances associated with
dial-up.53 This network promised, for the first time, to deliver high-
speed Internet access to retail subscribers.
TCI planned to use HFC technology to build a proprietary high-
speed network for its cable subscribers, but rather than having cus-
tomers simply plug into the Internet with all its congestion and relia-
bility problems, TCI would have @Home build its own high-speed
backbone parallel to the Internet. 54 The @Home network would util-
ize a series of Regional Data Centers ("RDCs") that could cache con-
tent physically close to subscribers, thereby reducing network
48. Id.
49. At Home Corp., Third Amended Registration Statement (Ex. 3.01 to Form S-
1) (May 16, 1997).
50. Cable companies had been unsuccessfully attempting to turn their cable lines
into something more than an antenna service since the 1970s. In the late 1970s,
Warner Cable rolled out its experimental online service, QUBE, in Columbus, Ohio.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Interactive TV (TCI, Inc.) and the Full Service
Network (TimeWarner) were "electronic superhighways into the home." See MARK
ROBICHAUX, CABLE COWBOY 125 (2002). However, by December 1992, these efforts
had failed. Both of these early services were closed, proprietary networks. MARK
ROBICHAUX, CABLE COWBOY 123-25, 153-54 (2002).
51. At Home Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 4 (March 31, 1998).
52. Download time for 2 mb file using a 56 kbps modem is approximately 5 min-
utes; the same file can be downloaded in 0.2 seconds using a 10 mbps cable modem.
Sharon Eisner Gillet & William Lehr, Availability of Broadband Internet Access: An
Empirical Analysis 3 n.7 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
53. At Home Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (May 16, 1997).
54. Id. at 41.
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congestion and allowing for fast downloads.5 5 Each of these proposed
RDCs could support between 500 and 1,000 subscribers. 56 The net-
work architecture that TCI envisioned for @Home ensured that sub-
scribers could access its proprietary multimedia content inside the
@Home fence without the congestion and frustration associated with
the public Internet and at a faster speed than competing dial-up ser-
vices. 57 @Home would provide subscribers with a customized
browser/interface and, through its start-page, would guide subscrib-
ers to broadband content like CD quality audio, video clips, games,
and shopping.58 @Home would be, in essence, AOL on steroids.
TCI envisioned third-party content providers paying to be lo-
cated inside the @Home fence to gain access to the large base of TCI's
subscribers. 59 The high speed of the network would permit content
providers to supply multimedia content that had not been available
up until that point to subscribers. Though subscribers would still be
able to access the Internet through the @Home network, TCI ex-
pected that the rich content inside the high-speed fence would keep
subscribers from straying far.
60
This new high-speed network would be expensive. It would cost
approximately $140 million to build the backbone and regional nodes
sufficient to service 10 million subscribers. 61 Upgrading cable sys-
tems to handle high-speed data traffic would cost an additional
$1,000-$3,000 per subscriber, but because TCI had failed to make
55. Id.
56. GEORGE ABE, RESIDENTIAL BROADBAND 153 (2001).
57. Lucien Rhodes, The Race for More Bandwidth, WIRED, Jan. 1996 (describing
the business model and technical challenges).
58. @Home offered subscribers access to content through its homepage, which it
organized in various channels that it hoped would simplify navigation and make on-
line content accessible to a mass audience. See At Home Corp., Registration State-
ment (Form S-1), at 5, 7 (May 16, 1997).
59. See Rhodes, supra note 57.
60. @Home offered subscribers "a customized browser and aggregated... mul-
timedia content" similar to the AOL strategy. At Home Corp., Registration Statement
(Form S-1), at 5 (May 16, 1997). See also Frank Rose, The $7 Billion Delusion, WIRED,
Jan. 2002, available at www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/excite.html (discussing
@Home's development). The "walled garden" strategy used by @Home is a common
one for various kinds of networked industries; most recently wireless telephone prov-
iders have been attempting the same strategy. See Li Yuan, Breaking Down the Walls
of Phones' Wireless Web Gardens, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2007, at B1.
61. Marc Gunther, The Cable Guys' Big Bet on the Net, FORTUNE, Nov. 25, 1996,
at 102.
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past upgrades, its costs were likely to be higher than the industry
average.
62
Compounding these costs was the fact that the cable industry
was highly fragmented. TCI's franchises, like those of other major
cable companies, were spread out across the country, and only a
small fraction could be found in contiguous clusters.63 The term
"clusters" refers to the rapid transformation of discontiguous geo-
graphic service areas into contiguous geographic service areas. For
example, in 1995 only 5.1 million subscribers out of approximately 62
million basic cable subscribers nationwide were located in clusters of
greater than 500,000 subscribers. 64 As a consequence of the dis-
persed nature of the cable service areas, fixed costs of serving cable
television subscribers were higher than they might have been had the
service areas been clustered. In order for @Home to become a viable
business and justify the high levels of fixed capital investment re-
quired, TCI would have to find a way to cooperate with competing
cable companies with contiguous franchises to build the @Home net-
work in a way that would benefit both TCI and its rivals.
65
To build this network, @Home and the cable companies offering
the service had to make large simultaneous investments in the net-
work's infrastructure. @Home, the network operator, had to make a
substantial investment in a nationwide fiber-optic network that
served as the backbone for this private network. @Home also had to
make a series of investments in RDCs to service between 500 and
1,000 potential subscribers each. 66 These RDCs had to be distributed
62. ABE, supra note 56, at 155. See also Joshua Cho, Cable Ops Spending Mega
Bucks to Upgrade Plant, CABLE WORLD, June 21, 1999; Deborah A. Lathen, BROAD-
BAND TODAY, Oct. 1999, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broad
bandtoday.pdf. TCI acquired a reputation for failing to invest in upgrades of the sort
that would be required to make the @Home network possible. See ROBICHAUX, supra
note 50, at 94, 164.
63. Municipalities typically regulate the provision of cable television services,
granting long-term exclusive contracts to cable companies in the form of renewable
franchises. At Home Corp., Notice and Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 26 (May
26, 2000).
64. See Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming,
FCC Release No. 97-423, 13 FCC Red 1034, 1998 FCC LEXIS 140, at *447-48 (Jan.
13, 1998). See also NCTA, CABLE DEVELOPMENTS 4, 222 (2002).
65. Although TCI, Cox, Comcast, and other cable providers each had monopoly
service areas, they competed against each other for service franchises. Their competi-
tion for these franchises can be characterized as intense. At the same time, the cable
companies cooperated in numerous areas outside the context of franchise competition
where cooperation might be valuable, such as in the development of television
programming.
66. ABE, supra note 56, at 153.
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around the country in locations where @Home was likely to attract
subscribers. Once deployed, the @Home backbone and RDCs had
only one real function: to service the @Home network. Any other use
for the assets would be of much lower value. As such, the network
was a specific investment.
In order to offer this service to its subscribers, cable companies
had to make complementary investments in upgrading their own
cable systems from analog to next-generation HFC. The HFC up-
grades were required to permit two-way, high-speed data transmis-
sion between a subscriber's desktop and an RDC. Since upgrading to
HFC often involved digging up streets to lay the new cable, the costs
associated with these upgrades were significant. At the time, there
was no other service that required the two-way capabilities that HFC
offered, so cable company investments in these upgrades would be
dedicated to a particular use, namely serving the @Home network
and its subscribers. As such, these upgrades would also be asset
specific.
The asset specific investments required to build the nationwide
@Home network, including the backbone, the RDCs, and the HFC up-
grades, presented significant contracting challenges. Because the in-
vestments were asset specific, the return on @Home's investments in
the backbone and RDCs was dependent upon the cooperation of the
cable companies, while the cable companies' investments were simul-
taneously dependent on the cooperation of @Home and each of the
other cable companies. If all the parties were not able to successfully
coordinate their investments, the individual investments would be
dramatically devalued.
IV. @HOME AS A RESPONSE TO ASSET SPECIFICITY
Given the asset specific nature of the investment in @Home, its
ownership structure, its internal governance, and its business strat-
egy can rightly be understood as a response to the challenges of asset
specificity.
A. Challenges Require Cooperation
In order for the network to be commercially viable, the chal-
lenges presented by the asset specific nature of the @Home network
required cooperation among rival cable companies.
In the mid-1990s, the nation's cable television networks resem-
bled a patchwork quilt because relatively few cable subscribers were
located in contiguous clusters managed by the same cable company.
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In 1996, there were only eighteen contiguous clusters of more than
400,000 subscribers, accounting for less than 12% of all cable
subscribers.
TCI was no different from other cable companies in this respect.
Because of the fractured nature of its network, it would have been
prohibitively expensive for TCI to build out the @Home network to its
11 million subscribers. 67 To spread the cost of investments in net-
work infrastructure over a large enough base of potential subscribers,
TCI had to find a way to partner with other cable companies. Cox
and Comcast were obvious partners as each had access to large sub-
scriber bases in areas contiguous with TCI's existing service areas.
At the time, Comcast was the fourth largest cable company in the
country, with 4.28 million subscribers nationwide, while Cox was the
fifth largest with 3.26 million subscribers.68 Combined with TCrs
subscribers, these three cable partners would give the @Home net-
work access to about 18.5 million cable subscribers - 29% of all cable
subscribers in 1995.69
Bringing the three rivals together to offer the @Home service
would be difficult, however. The biggest of the challenges would be
creating credible incentives to induce the parties to cooperate rather
than to free ride on others' specific investments. At the network
level, TCI, through @Home, needed to make large, highly asset-spe-
cific investments in a national backbone and regional data centers
that would cache content in numerous locations near subscribers on
the network. At the subscriber level, each of TCI, Cox, and Comcast
needed to make significant investments in upgrading their local cable
networks from analog to HFC technology. Each of the cable partners
making investments in HFC risked a potential hold-up by TCI. Un-
less TCI simultaneously invested in caching and backbone infrastruc-
ture, the HFC upgrades made by each of the participating cable
companies would not be valuable. Without access to TCI's backbone
infrastructure or the cache services at the system level of the @Home
network, the cable companies' HFC upgrades would be essentially
useless. Until this hold-up threat could be credibly overcome, TCI,
Cox, and Comcast would find it difficult to move from the equilibrium
position and coordinate the investments needed to make the network
a reality.
67. At Home Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 12 (May 16, 1997).
68. Id.
69. NCTA, Table: Basic Cable 1979-2001, CABLE DEVELOPMENTS 4 (2002) (64.6
million basic cable subscribers in 1996).
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B. Overcoming Challenges of Asset Specificity
In response to these challenges, TCI, Cox, and Comcast em-
ployed a number of solutions to safeguard their relationships against
opportunism. First, the parties agreed to a joint ownership model for
the network and the data centers. To this end, TCI sold minority
stakes in @Home to Cox and Comcast while retaining a majority of
shares for itself.
At the network level, @Home was responsible for managing traf-
fic and aggregating content on its own network. Each of the partici-
pating cable companies retained ownership and control over its own
cable network and relationships with its subscribers. The structure
of joint ownership of the @Home entity included a number of govern-
ance mechanisms designed to protect Cox and Comcast from possible
opportunistic behavior by TCI.
70
Second, Cox, Comcast, and TCI each agreed to provide @Home
with the exclusive right to market cable Internet to their subscribers.
Exclusivity eliminated the possibility that any of the rival companies
might attempt to build a competing network or direct traffic to a
third-party network during the contract period and thereby gave Cox
and Comcast an incentive to cooperate with TCI in building the
@Home network. These exclusivity arrangements were subject to an
important exception, discussed below, meant to address potential op-
portunism by TCI in complying with its own obligations to upgrade
its systems and market the @Home service to its subscribers.
Finally, exclusivity was limited to an initial five-year period be-
cause TCI envisioned economic lock-in inducing long-term coopera-
tion between the three companies. This lock-in would require the
creation of a valuable network with popular content "inside the
@Home fence." The attractiveness and difficulty to replicate the
@Home network would lock in subscribers and thus leave Cox and
Comcast locked in once the period of exclusivity ended in 2002.
1. Joint Ownership and Governance Mechanisms
In June 1996, TCI sold minority equity stakes in the @Home ven-
ture to Cox and Comcast.71 Comcast and Cox each purchased 13.4%
of @Home's Series A Preferred stock, representing a total of 11.8% of
70. See infra Section 3.2.A.
71. Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital fund, was already a minority shareholder
at the time Cox and Comcast were added as "Additional Investors" in 1996. See At
Home Corp., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-I/A) (June 20, 1997).
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the voting power.7 2 TCI maintained the largest economic interest as
well as voting control of the enterprise. Though TCI's high-vote Se-
ries T Preferred shares equaled 42.8% of the equity value, they repre-
sented 74.9% of the voting power of @Home.
73
TABLE 1: SHARE DISTRIBUTION AND VOTING STRUCTURE
7 4
% OF
SHAREHOLDER TYPE OF SHARES EQUITY VOTING % DIRECTORS
TCI Series T Preferred 42.8% 74.9% 2 Series T
Series A Preferred 3 Series A
Kleiner Perkins Series K Preferred 12.2% 5.4% 1 Series K
Comcast Series A Preferred 13.4% 5.9% 1 Series A
Cox Series A Preferred 13.4% 5.9% 1 Series A
Management Management Pool 5.1% 1.6% 1 Common
Shares - Common
Other Common 9.6% 3.9%
(employees,
friends, family,
etc.)
TOTAL 100% 100% 9
While joint ownership of @Home addressed the issues of asset
specificity by internalizing some incentives for opportunism, it did
not prevent TCI from potentially abusing its position as controlling
shareholder to extract rents from the joint entity at the expense of
Cox and Comcast. For example, without additional safeguards, TCI
might have an incentive to use its majority position to roll out the
@Home service in areas where TCI subscribers were primarily lo-
cated. Alternatively, TCI might use its position to promote video ser-
vices on the @Home network that might compete directly with cable
television services offered by Cox and Comcast.
To manage problems of this type, the parties coupled joint owner-
ship with specialized governance mechanisms designed to limit TCI's
ability to act opportunistically against minority shareholders. One of
these mechanisms was a "board within a board" (the Series A direc-
tors) that consisted of three directors nominated by TCI and one di-
rector each nominated by Cox and Comcast. @Home's. certificate of
72. These ownership percentages were calculated immediately prior to @Home's
June 1997 IPO. See At Home Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-l), at 70 (July
11, 1997).
73. Prior to the IPO, Kleiner Perkins held 13.55% of the outstanding equity and
5.4% of the voting power through its Series K shares. Id.
74. Id.
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incorporation specified that these Series A directors would have spe-
cial voting rights to approve certain corporate actions, including ad-
justments in revenue splits, approval of capital investment budgets,
and approval of competing online video offerings. 75 These voting
rights required either unanimity among the cable partners or assent
of at least one of Cox or Comcast. This structure ensured that while
TCI could set the agenda for board action, it could not act opportunis-
tically against the minority shareholders.
One area of particular concern for the @Home partners was the
treatment of online content providers that would be critical to the
success of an AOL-like online service. 76 Through its controlling stake
in @Home, TCI could cause the network to favor TCI-owned content
providers over content providers owned by Cox or Comcast or other
third parties. For example, TCI could cause @Home to favor a TCI-
owned search engine over either Looksmart or About.com, owned in
part by Cox and Comcast respectively, by limiting the ability of non-
preferred search engines or other content providers to cache their
content on the @Home network or by limiting the visibility of non-
preferred content on @Home's start page.
To manage the potential conflict over access to the @Home net-
work, the shareholders created the ".Com Committee."77 The .Com
Committee was designed to ensure equal treatment and equal access
75. The supermajority voting structure limits the opportunism discussed in the
previous section by requiring supermajority approval for: the approval of any funda-
mental transaction, like a merger, declaration of dividends, or appointment of a CEO;
the adoption of any budget that serves to create unequal rollout of services; any
change in the revenue split between @Home and its cable company partners; and the
appointment of outside directors to oversee contracting for online content for the
@Home service with related parties (the ".Com" Committee). The unanimous provi-
sions required amongst the Series A directors (Cox, Comcast, and TCI) before the
board might approve any action for recourse debt, to change the number of directors,
or to modify rights of Series A. At Home Corp., Fourth Amended Registration State-
ment (Form S-I/A) (July 8, 1997) [hereinafter At Home Corp., Fourth Amended]. See
also At Home Corp., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-i/A) (June 20, 1997).
Provision of video services by @Home required a supermajority vote of all the cable
companies. At Home Corp., Master Distribution Agreement Term Sheet (Form S-I/A)
(June 20, 1997) [hereinafter At Home Corp., MDA].
76. Each of the cable partners had ownership stakes in websites and other online
content services. For example, TCI held ownership stakes in Priceline.com, iVillage,
Homegrocer.com, Pogo.com, Student.net, Wine.com, and Women.com among many
others. Cox held ownership interests in Looksmart, Homestore.com, Autotrader.com
and MP3.com among others. Comcast held ownership interests in About.com, Tick-
etmaster.com, CulterFinder.com, and Deja.com among others. Price Colman, Old Me-
dia Dotcom: New Media Are the Hot Investment for Cable Operators and Broadcasters,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1999, at 62.
77. Id.
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to the @Home network for all providers' content regardless of owner-
ship.78 By adopting a content-neutral mechanism, TCI credibly sig-
naled to Cox and Comcast that it would not use @Home to promote its
content to the exclusion of third parties.
7 9
To guard against the possibility of TCI using the @Home start
page to promote its own content at the expense of its partners, the
parties built in safeguards to regulate placement of content on the
start page. One of these safeguards involved dividing the start page
into two separate areas: local and national. Local cable operators
each had complete control over the placement of links in and access to
the local area of the @Home start page, thereby permitting local
branding and localized content. Access to the national section of the
start page was controlled by @Home.80 However, Cox and Comcast
each retained the right to block up to three links appearing in the
national portion of @Home's start page and could block additional
links in exchange for payments."' The free blocks gave Cox and Com-
cast the ability to limit TCI's potential abuse of its position as control-
ling shareholder. At the same time, by making it costly for Cox and
Comcast to block more than three links, the provision ensured that
Cox and Comcast would only use their veto power when it was
necessary.
8 2
2. Contracting with Safeguards: Exclusivity Arrangements
Notwithstanding Cox and Comcast's economic interests in
@Home, the possibility remained that the cable companies might use
78. "[@Home] acknowledges and agrees that its policy and practice with respect
to its willingness to negotiate and enter into all .Com Agreements ... is one of open-
ness and non-exclusion, regardless of the identity of such content provider and its
relationship with [@Home], and that it is in the best interest of [@Home] and its
stockholders for [@Home] to enter into as many such agreements as is practicable."
At Home Corp., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-i/A), at 26 (June 20, 1997).
79. Notwithstanding @Home's content-neutral stance, the network nevertheless
subjected video streaming to a binding constraint of no more than ten minutes in
length. One might properly interpret discrimination against video content as an at-
tempt by the cable partners to protect their interests in more traditional video pro-
gramming. See At Home Corp., MDA, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. These payments took the form of an adjustment to the 65-35 revenue split
agreed to by the parties. In the event Cox or Comcast blocked more than ten links,
then the blocking party would reduce its revenue sharing to zero. Id.
82. In the end, these protections turned out not to be very relevant as the terms
of the Master Distribution Agreement expressly permitted subscribers to the @Home
service to change the default start-page on their web browsers, thereby making it
relatively simple for a subscriber to "exit" the @Home network, or at least to avoid
visiting the start-page. Id.
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their monopoly over access to subscribers to hold up @Home and
thereby extract surplus from TCI once the network was in opera-
tion.8 3 In June 1997, TCI, Cox, and Comcast entered into distribu-
tion agreements (Master Distribution Agreements or "MDAs") with
@Home that locked each of them into a five-year exclusive arrange-
ment. 4 By doing this, Cox and Comcast gave up their ability to force
an opportunistic renegotiation over content during the first five years
of the network's operation.
The five-year term of the MDA was relatively short in light of the
asset specific investments that @Home had to make.85 Since @Home
entered into a twenty-year lease with AT&T for backbone capacity to
serve the network, 6 the five-year term of the MDA therefore invited
an opportunistic negotiation at a point when @Home would still have
significant future costs associated with the backbone lease. 87
Because a long-term supply contract was not feasible, the parties
relied on an expectation of the value of @Home's network as an eco-
nomic lock-in. They expected the five-year exclusivity agreement
would be sufficient to bridge the gap between the initial investment
period and the point at which the network would be uniquely valua-
ble. With a valuable network in place, exclusivity would no longer be
required to induce cooperation because the costs of exiting the net-
work would be so high that any threat to do so would not be credible.
In addition to setting the length of the exclusivity period, the
MDA outlined pricing policies for the @Home service. Pricing policies
83. Klein examined how long-term contracting between General Motors and
Fisher Body reduced the incentive of General Motors to act opportunistically against
Fisher Body, thereby inducing Fisher Body to make certain asset specific invest-
ments. At the same time, the requirement that General Motors deal exclusively with
Fisher Body created an incentive for Fisher Body to engage in a "reverse hold-up" of
General Motors by either "increasing price or decreasing quality." See Klein, supra
note 29, at 201. Williamson calls this phenomenon the "fundamental transformation"
or that point when large numbers competition gives way to a monopoly relationship
following an investment decision, fundamentally altering the economic incentives
among the parties. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPI-
TALISM 61-63 (1985).
84. At Home Corp., MDA, supra note 75.
85. The long-term contracts of the type described in Section 2, supra, are typi-
cally long enough to amortize the costs of the specific investments. For example, the
terms of nine of the ten long-term contracts examined by Goldberg and Erickson were
at least ten years with a presumption that they would last for twenty years. See
Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 5, at 377.
86. At Home Corp., Registration of Securities (Form S-4), at 147 (Apr. 27, 1999).
See also At Home Corp., Amended Annual Report (Form 10-K405/A) (Apr. 27, 1999).
87. However, given the rapid obsolescence of technology, with the exception of
the twenty-year backbone lease, most of the investments in the network could be am-
ortized over the initial five-year period.
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determined the allocation of revenues between @Home and cable
companies offering the service (including, but not limited to Cox,
Comcast, and TCI). @Home, Cox, Comcast, and TCI adopted a reve-
nue splitting formula akin to a commission pricing approach. Cox,
Comcast, and TCI, along with any third-party cable company that
offered the @Home service, would keep 65% of subscriber revenues,
while @Home would receive 35%.88
The revenue splitting approach adopted by @Home permitted the
cable companies, which had better information about their subscrib-
ers, to adjust retail prices in real time without having to negotiate
pricing with @Home. In addition, the strategy was simple and left
little to dispute. Once the revenues came in, a cable company only
needed to send 35% of it to @Home. As discussed in Section 1.4,
supra, such a pricing strategy can be appropriate where the reseller
is adding little value beyond acting as a middle man and arranging
for resale of a service.
8 9
The pricing strategy adopted by the parties, however, was
plagued by some important weaknesses. First, the cable companies
were doing more than just brokering the sale of the @Home service.
The local cable companies added value through a number of activi-
ties, including billing and technical and customer service. As a re-
sult, the actual costs associated with the cable companies' offering
the service were subject to some degree of variability that might or
might not have been reflected adequately in the uniform revenue
split.9° Properly assigning these costs internally could have proven
troublesome or created incentives for TCI, Cox, or Comcast to spend
less on these value-added services than might have been optimal.
Second, Cox, Comcast, and TCI all had an incentive to use the pricing
formula to extract surplus from @Home. For example, TCI, Cox, or
Comcast could bundle the @Home service together with premium
cable services, effectively using the @Home service as a loss leader to
88. This was subject to certain reductions in the event they elected to block ac-
cess to content on the @Home website. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
89. Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 5, at 382-83. In this case it is arguable
whether the participating cable companies, which managed local networks, as well as
handled customer service and billing, were merely middlemen and not adding value.
90. The highly fragmented nature of the cable industry in the mid-1990s made
offering the @Home service outside a cable company's core clusters marginally less
profitable because the average costs of servicing smaller clusters was higher for cable
companies than it was for @Home. See NCTA, CABLE DEVELOPMENTS 4, 222 (2002); At
Home Corp., Notice and Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 26 (May 26, 2000);
Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC Re-
lease No. 97-423, 13 FCC Rcd 1034, 1998 FCC LEXIS 140, at *447-48 (Jan. 13, 1998);
supra note 65.
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attract customers to other services.9 1 Though simple, the commis-
sion pricing strategy adopted by @Home and its partners was subject
to considerable vulnerabilities that made it a less-than-optimal pric-
ing strategy.
3. Contracting with Safeguards: Creating Lock-in
A key component of @Home's network design was the develop-
ment of a content-rich environment. 92 @Home would, much like
AOL, provide subscribers with "directory and navigation services"
connecting them to broadband content on the network.93 @Home's
service would be different from AOL's in that its high-speed network
would be able to deliver more and richer content to subscribers. Con-
tent providers wishing to gain access to @Home's large subscriber
base would have to pay for placement on the @Home start-page or
inside the @Home fence. Third-party content aggregated inside the
high-speed @Home fence created a competitive advantage for @Home
against its dial-up competitors: AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy.
The creation of a valuable, content-oriented network would have
important benefits for TCI and @Home in maintaining their relation-
ship with Cox and Comcast. Specifically, a valuable network would
improve @Home's bargaining position upon expiration of the five-
year exclusivity provision of the MDA. As a valuable destination for
@Home's subscribers, a content-rich network would create positive
switching costs and thus mitigate the potential for either Cox or
Comcast to act opportunistically upon the expiration of the MDA. In
the absence of these positive switching costs, at the expiration of the
MDA, Cox and Comcast would be able to credibly threaten to switch
away from the @Home network and thus capture more surplus in any
subsequent renegotiation of the relationship between the cable com-
panies and @Home. In addition, a valuable @Home network would
provide assurance to Cox and Comcast that TCI would maintain its
relationships with the network and continue supporting its expan-
sion. Finally, a valuable network would be attractive to other non-
equity-holding cable companies seeking to offer online services to
their subscribers. @Home could sell Internet access to third-party
91. In bankruptcy filings, @Home's creditors alleged that Cox, Comcast, and TCI
engaged in pricing practices that siphoned revenue away from @Home and to other
revenue-generating services, thereby benefiting each of the cable companies at the
expense of @Home. See Decision Re Debtor's Motion to Reject Executory Contracts,
In Re At Home Corp., No. 01-3-2495-TC (N.D. Cal. Nov 30, 2001).
92. At Home Corp., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-V/A) (June 20,
1997).
93. At Home Corp., Fourth Amended, supra note 75.
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cable companies and their subscribers, thereby diversifying @Home's
subscriber base and reducing @Home's reliance on any single cable
company for subscribers. Diversification of the subscriber base would
further assist @Home in resisting subsequent hold-ups by any of its
cable company shareholders.
4. Contracting with Safeguards: The "High C" Test
Though cable-based online access is now commonplace, the suc-
cess of such a product was far from certain.9 4 The technology was
unproven, and the market for online services was very competitive.
At the same time, upgrade costs were significant: as much as $30
billion to upgrade all the homes passed by the @Home partners.9 5
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the best strategy for @Home
was for all the cable partners to cooperate and simultaneously invest
in upgrades to serve the network. Doing so would create the largest
possible pool of potential subscribers and increase the economic value
of the network while lowering @Home's unit costs. If successful, the
benefits would be shared by all the shareholders of @Home. The
costs associated with the upgrades, however, which were larger than
the costs of the backbone and the regional data centers, would be
borne by the individual cable companies and not @Home.
TCI, Cox, and Comcast were not identical with respect to the
physical plants that they brought to the @Home venture. TCI was
the largest cable company in the United States with far more poten-
tial subscribers for the @Home service than any other cable company.
However, TCI had a reputation in the industry for not investing in its
physical plant.96 Consistent with its reputation, by 1997 only about
7% of the TCI network had been upgraded to HFC. Cox and Comcast
were more aggressive in upgrading their physical plants with 19%
and 12%, respectively, of their networks already served by HFC (see
Table 2 below). The disparity in the quality of the physical plants
created an incentive for TCI to withhold investments in further up-
grades of its network until the business plan's viability had been
proven on the basis of Cox and Comcast's upgrades. However, suc-
cess of the online service relied on creating the largest network possi-
ble.9 7 As a result, the parties needed to create a mechanism to
94. Supra note 50.
95. FCC Staff Report, BROADBAND TODAY, October 1999, at 26.
96. ROBmCHAUX, supra note 50, at 94-95.
97. Ensuring the largest network possible was important to the success of
@Home in part because online service provision is a "two-sided" market. Two-sided
markets are markets where "two sets of agents interact through an intermediary plat-
form, and... the decisions of each set of agents [whether to participate in the market]
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jumpstart TCI's network upgrades and create credible expectations
among the rival cable companies that TCI would cooperate by up-
grading its plant.
TABLE 2: Two-WAY HFC UPGRADES
% of Homes Passed 98
1996 1997 1998 1999 200
@Home 4.5% 9% 23% 33% 51%
TCI [-1 7% [- 25% 51.8%
Cox 1.4% 19% 44% 46% 73%
Comcast N/A 12% 24% 34% 50%
Cox and Comcast were able to alter TCI's incentive to free ride by
tying their exclusive commitment to @Home to an objective perform-
ance measure: the "High C" test. Under the High C provision, if TCI
was unable to generate two times as many subscribers as a percent-
age of "homes passed" than either Cox or Comcast by mid-1999, then
either Cox or Comcast, or both, would be permitted to terminate its
exclusive commitment. 99 In the event TCI did not cooperate, then
affects the [decisions of other agents], typically through an externality." Marc Rys-
man, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. EcON. PERSPECT. 125, 125 (2009).
In this case the larger the network, the more likely retail subscribers will want to
participate. At the same time, the more retail subscribers, the more likely online con-
tent providers will want to locate their content on the @Home network. See generally
DAVID EvANs & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PIASTIC (1999) (on the develop-
ment of payment and credit card networks and two-sided markets).
98. Homes Passed: A home is "passed" if it can be connected to the company's
network without any further extension of the network. NCTA, supra note 64, at 15.
Sources for data in table: At Home Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Apr. 2,
2001) (38 million of 74 million homes passed); At Home Corp., Annual Report (Form
10-K405), at 3 (Mar. 30, 2000) (24 million of 72 million homes passed); At Home Corp.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 4 (Feb. 19, 1999) (13.2 million of 57.3 million
homes passed); At Home Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 4 (Mar. 31, 1998)
(4.5 million of 50 million homes passed); At Home Corp., Registration Statement
(Form S-1), at 6 (May 16, 1997); Comcast Corp., Registration of Securities (Form S-4),
at VII-5 (Feb. 11, 2002) (1999: 4.974 million data ready/marketable homes passed;
2000: 14.523 million data ready/marketable homes passed) (AT&T Broadband data);
Comcast Holdings, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Mar. 2, 2001) (1999: data ready:
6,360,000); Cox Communications, Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 4 (Mar. 19,
2001) (2000: data ready: 7,122,773; subscribers: 481,947); Cox Communications,
Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 6 (Mar. 23, 2000) (1999: data ready: 3,759,229;
subscribers: 186,918); Cox Communications, Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 6
(Mar. 29, 1999) (1997: data ready: 954,271; 1998: data ready: 2,634,515); Cox
Communications, Annual Report (Form 10-K405), at 8 (Mar. 19, 1998) (1996: 70,909
data ready, 134 subscribers).
99. The "High C" provision reads as follows:
Performance Default" shall occur, if as of the indicated date, the High C Per-
formance Ratio exceeds the product of ) two times (II) the TCI Performance
Ratio. The "High C Performance Ratio" shall be the greater of (i) the amount
equal to (x) the aggregate number of residential subscribers to the @Home
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Cox or Comcast had the ability to unilaterally withdraw from
@Home, thereby reducing the entity's value and punishing TCI for
defecting.
C. Summary of the Deal
In sum, when the @Home service was successfully rolled out to
subscribers in 1997, its corporate structure was knit together by a
number of contractual safeguards intended to manage the problems
of asset specificity and induce TCI, Cox and Comcast to make sub-
stantial investments that, together, would create a nationwide broad-
band network. If TCI aggressively upgraded its old network and
marketed @Home's service, then exclusivity would be maintained.
Otherwise, Cox and Comcast would be free to effectively terminate
the agreement and seek other means of providing broadband Internet
services to their subscribers.
The @Home network appeared to be a technical success by 2000.
In 1996, only 4.5% of the homes passed in @Home's network were
utilizing HFC networks. By the end of 2000, that number was
51%.100 When @Home went public in July 1997, it had only 5,000
subscribers. By December 2000, @Home reported over 4 million sub-
scribers. 10 1 In addition to the three original shareholders, by 2000
@Home had sold access to its service to at least thirteen other large
cable companies that collectively served 93% of all cable television
subscribers.'
0 2
Service of Comcast Cable and its Controlled Affiliates, divided by (y) the ag-
gregate number of Homes Passed by Qualifying Systems owned by Comcast
Cable and its Controlled Affiliates and (ii) the amount equal to (a) the aggre-
gate number of residential subscribers to the @Home Service of [Cox] and its
Controlled Affiliates, divided by (b) the aggregate number of Homes Passed
by Qualifying Systems owned by [Cox] and its Controlled Affiliates, in each
such case as of the end of the calendar month preceding the date of determi-
nation (the Cable Partner with respect to whom such amount is greater as of
the applicable date of determination being referred to herein as the "High
C"). The "TCI Performance Ratio" shall be an amount equal to (A) the
amount equal to (x) the aggregate number of residential subscribers to the
@Home Service of TCI and its Controlled Affiliates, divided by (B) the aggre-
gate number of Homes Passed by Qualifying Systems owned by TCI and its
Controlled Affiliates, in each case as of the end of the calendar month preced-
ing the date of determination.
A home is deemed "passed" if it can be connected to the company's network without
any further extension of the network. At Home Corp., MDA, supra note 75.
100. See supra Table 2: Two-Way HFC Upgrades.
101. Konrad et al., supra note 3.
102. TCIIAT&T, Comcast, Cox, Charter, Adelphia, Cablevision, Mediacom, and In-
sight all offered the @Home service by the end of 2000. These companies represented
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@Home's rapid growth also included its shareholder base.
@Home started as a closely-held venture owned by TCI. By 2000,
@Home had added many shareholders, including the Kleiner Perkins
venture fund, cable companies Cox, Comcast, Cablevision, and Rog-
ers Communications, and public shareholders. @Home had grown
from a closely-held start-up to the country's largest provider of broad-
band online service in a little more than three years. As a result of its
IPO, @Home developed interests independent of its cable company
founders and required a management team with duties to all of its
shareholders. These separate interests became salient after 2000
when the interests of Cox, Comcast, and TCI began to diverge.
@Home is an excellent example of how parties can respond to the
problems presented by asset specificity through the use of contract
and transactional structures. The founding partners of @Home used
these tools to create credible expectations of cooperation that over-
came each party's incentives to act opportunistically. Economic lock-
in was the linchpin of the deal structure. At the same time, it was
also the structure's Achilles' heel. If @Home was not able to create a
network that was valuable to the cable partners, then the venture
would fail.
V. @HOME'S DEMISE: EXOGENOUS CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY
UNDERMINE THE TRANSACTION STRUCTURES
Just as @Home was successfully ramping up its service, changes
in the underlying business environment and the technology of the In-
ternet conspired to erode many of @Home's competitive advantages.
During the 1990s, investments by the telecom industry significantly
reduced congestion and improved the reliability of the public In-
ternet. At the same time, firms began to offer plain vanilla high-
speed access to the Internet as well as caching services that increased
the speed with which a user could access content. The rapid accept-
ance of browser technologies, like Netscape Navigator and Internet
Explorer, and improvements in directory and search services, like
Yahoo!, AltaVista, and Looksmart, gave the Internet a user-friendly
face. This combination made the Internet accessible to novice users
and reduced the importance of the content intermediation role that
@Home hoped to play. Finally, cable companies aggressively moved
to defragment their markets through "clustering" strategies. The re-
sult of all these changes, just as @Home was hitting its stride, was
eight of the ten largest cable companies in the United States at the time. At Home
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (April 2, 2001); NCTA, supra note 64, at 8.
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that many conditions contributing to @Home's competitive advantage
no longer existed.
A. Decrease in Congestion
While backbone capacity was a constraint in 1995, by 2001 there
was a glut of high-speed backbone capacity that reduced Internet
congestion. During the 1999-2001 period, more than 100 million
miles of optical fiber were laid.10 3 At the same time, technological
advances (e.g., multiplexing, technology which allowed for the trans-
mittal of multiple signals simultaneously down one line of cable) in-
creased the throughput of each single piece of fiber. 10 4 The
confluence of these forces resulted in a rapid decrease in congestion
on the Internet. In 1998 alone, network speeds at the Internet's ac-
cess points increased by 60% from the previous year.
10 5
The increase in backbone capacity led to increased competition in
the provision of high-speed data services. Whereas there were only a
small handful of backbones available in 1995, by 2000 there were al-
ready over forty competing private national backbones that could
carry Internet traffic.' 0 6 Availability of new capacity also led to in-
creased competition at the retail level and, by 2000, a number of re-
tail service providers had sprung up to sell high-speed Internet
access services to cable companies. For example, companies like
High Speed Access Corp. and ISP Channel offered basic, turnkey In-
ternet packages specifically designed to allow even a small cable sys-
tem to provide Internet access services to its subscribers.
10 7
In addition, substitutes for @Home's caching services (which pre-
viously had contributed to @Home's competitive advantage) appeared
in the marketplace by 2000. Private caching services from Akamai,
103. Simon Romero, Shining Future of Fiber Optics Loses Glimmer, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2001, at Al (noting that the price of a ten year contract for a fiber optic
phone line had fall by nearly 90% between 1999 and 2001.)
104. Sidak notes that improvements in division multiplexing increased the num-
ber of channels on each strand of installed fiber from 2 to over 1,000 channels per
strand. See J. Gergory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud
and the Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J.
REG. 207, 216 (2003).
105. World Wide Wait 60 Percent Shorter, WIRED, Mar. 11, 1998, available at http:/
/www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/1998/03/10846.
106. Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 14
(FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper No. 32, 2000).
107. High Speed Access Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 32 (Mar. 19,
1999); American Independence Corp., Amended Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 44
(Feb. 2, 1999).
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Inktomi, Network Appliances, and others replicated @Home's cach-
ing services. 08 These services placed servers in strategic locations
around Internet interconnections and hosted content for a fee in the
same way that @Home did. The combination of increased capacity
plus the emergence of private caching services reduced the value of
the @Home network in the marketplace.
B. Improvements in Accessibility
Development of browser applications and search technologies in
the mid-1990s facilitated consumers' Internet use and thereby re-
duced the value of @Home's role as an intermediary. Until that time,
online service market leaders like AOL and Prodigy provided both
the means to access the Internet and the proprietary software for
guiding subscribers to preferred content.10 9 By the end of the 1990s,
however, that business model was becoming obsolete. With the com-
bination of browser and search services, subscribers could easily rep-
licate the content intermediation function played by online service
providers like @Home. 110
C. Increases in Clustering Activity
During the summer of 1997, cable companies began to aggres-
sively consolidate their subscribers into "clusters."' " Recall that, in
1996, only 18% of cable subscribers were located in large clusters of
108. Jeff Pelline, Ending the "World Wide Wait", CNET NEWS, Oct. 27, 1997, http:/
/news.com.com/Ending mhe+World+Wide+Wait/2100-1001_3-204673.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2010). See also Akamai Techs. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/405), at
5-6, 48 (Mar. 3, 2000).
109. Yahoo! and other search firms organized and presented online content to non-
expert users in a user-friendly fashion, thus taking away from @Home the intermedi-
ation function that it relied on to generate traffic to its start page.
110. In addition, the rise of free, Web-based e-mail services, like Hotmail, which
were portable, made it easier still for subscribers to be divorced from their Internet
Service Providers, thus reducing switching costs and subscriber lock-in. Indeed, even
Microsoft's MSN moved away from its proprietary business model not long after it
was launched in 1995. Kathy Rebello with Amy Cortese & Rob Hof, Inside Microsoft,
Bus. WEEK, July 15, 1996, available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1996/
b3484001.arc.htm. By 1998, online service provider Prodigy "had moved entirely to
relying on the Web for its content." DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND
OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 18-5 (2003). The market leader at the time, AOL suf-
fered a similar fate. It began to lose subscribers beginning in 2002 as they migrated
to "naked" broadband services without content. See From :-) to :-(; Time Warner and
AOL, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2006, at 63.
111. The rapid "clustering" of the cable industry (meaning transformation into
contiguous geographic cable television areas) was started by TCI in the summer of
1997 as it sought to improve its economies of scale. See Interview by Tom Southwick
with Leo Hindery (Aug. 7, 2001), available at www.cablecenter.org/education/library/
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greater than 400,000 subscribers. From 1997-1999, some 40-50% of
all subscribers in the cable industry changed hands in "subscriber
swaps."1" 2 By 2000, approximately 58% of all cable subscribers were
located in large clusters of greater than 400,000 subscribers (see Ta-
ble 3 below). Whereas in the mid-1990s fragmentation required that
cable companies find some way to cooperate in rolling out a cable-
based online service, in 2000 cable companies found themselves con-
trolling ever-larger concentrations of subscribers. With large, contig-
uous groupings of their own subscribers, cable companies could more
efficiently manage their own networks and compete against new com-
petitors, like telephone companies and satellite-based providers.
TABLE 3: CLUSTERING ACTIVITY 1996-199911
3
Numbers of
Subscribers 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
400-499,000 8 3.6 8 3.7 7 3.2 9 3.9 13 5.9
>500,000 10 7.7 16 11.9 21 19.6 28 23.8 34 34.3
Total 18 11.3 24 15.6 28 22.8 37 27.7 47 40.2
% Total Subs 18% 24% 34% 40% 58%
The combined effect of the changes in the market and technology
was to reduce the economic lock-in of agreements underlying the
@Home network while increasing the value of the public Internet.
Subscribers could replicate many of @Home's intermediation and
oralHistoryVideo.cfin?id=lll&ln=hindery (describing subscriber swap activity begin-
ning in 1997).
112. Interview, supra note 111. "Subscriber swaps" are common transactions in
the cable industry in which one cable company swaps its rights to a municipal
franchise to another. Swaps are usually motivated by an interest to consolidate oth-
erwise fragmented subscriber bases. Cable companies engaged in subscriber swaps
amongst themselves in order fill in "gaps" and generate larger and larger clusters in
particular areas of the country. TCI/AT&T was concentrated in technology-friendly
cities like San Francisco, Boston, Denver, Dallas/Ft. Worth, and Atlanta. Comcast
had clusters of subscribers in several large Eastern cities, including Baltimore, Phila-
delphia, and Detroit. Cox had clusters of subscribers in metropolitan areas in the
South and Southwest, including Phoenix, San Diego, Las Vegas, and New Orleans.
See Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC
Release No. 02-338, 17 FCC Red 26901 (Dec. 31, 2002); NCTA, supra note 64, at 222
(providing an industry definition of "clustering" as the "grouping together of indepen-
dent cable systems in a larger, more efficient single system that utilizes some of the
same infrastructure."); Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video
Programming, FCC Release No. 98-335, 13 FCC Rcd 24284 (Dec. 17, 1998); Status of
Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC Release No. 97-
423, 13 FCC Rcd 1034 (Jan. 13, 1998).
113. FCC02-338, FCC 97-423, FCC 98-335 and NCTA, CABLE DEVELOPMENTS
2002.
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search services. "Naked" Internet services, where a broadband ac-
cess company provided only Internet access without access to proprie-
tary online services, became the dominant business model.
114
VI. @HOME UNRAVELS
The most important lesson from @Home's experience can be sim-
ply stated: contractual safeguards and transactional strategies can
be effective in altering incentives so as to jump-start efficient asset
specific investments that would not be made otherwise. However,
safeguards and structures only go so far and can be vulnerable to
adverse changes in the underlying business environment. @Home re-
sponded to the coordination challenges of asset specificity by relying
on economic lock-in to tie the original cable partners together. By
making the network valuable to its partners, @Home hoped to create
credible incentives to encourage cooperation in building-out and de-
veloping the network. Ultimately, however, when changes in the in-
dustry lowered switching costs and made lock-in less feasible, the
transaction structure proved imperfect.
To make matters worse, when TCI's performance was evaluated
for the first time under the "High C" test in 1999, the company was
deemed to be in performance default. 115 Recall that the High C test
required TCI's ratio of@Home subscribers to homes passed by its net-
work to be greater than double the same ratio for either Cox or Com-
cast. At the end of the first quarter of 1999, Cox reported 90,000
subscribers to the @Home service out of 8 million homes passed
(1.125%).116 For the same period, TCI reported only 50,000 subscrib-
ers out of a base of nearly 19 million homes passed (0.26%).117 In
114. There remains a tension between the proprietary network business model
and the naked Internet service business model that one can see in current debates
about network neutrality. For an overview of this debate see Mark A. Lemley & Law-
rence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) and Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2005) (outlin-
ing the debate and taking the position that network neutrality is the preferred
approach).
115. After a failed merger attempt with Bell Atlantic, TCI faced internal financing
difficulties in 1997 that resulted in its reducing its efforts to upgrade systems to HFC.
Tim Barkow, Dueling with the Death Star, WIRED, Apr. 1997, available at http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/5.04/updata.htm. Cox agreed not to terminate the MDA pur-
suant to the "High C" test in exchange for promises of additional stock in @Home in
the event TCI failed to meet a targt of 277,000 subscribers by March 2000. At Home
Corp., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D/A), at Ex. 13 (April 13, 1999).
116. Alan Breznick, Cox, Comcast Gain Greater Control of @Home, Cable World,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 6.
117. Id.
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order for TCI to meet the requirements of the High C test, the com-
pany would have needed a base of at least 427,500 subscribers.
When TCI failed to meet its obligations under the "High C" clause,
Cox and Comcast obtained a right to immediately terminate the
agreement's exclusivity provisions. 118 Thus, Cox and Comcast were
freed from their contractual commitment to exclusivity even before
the end of the five-year term. Moreover, the changes that were occur-
ring elsewhere in the industry gave them considerable bargaining
power over @Home.
Rather than immediately terminate the distribution agreements,
Cox and Comcast used their newfound bargaining power to renegoti-
ate and improve their position in the @Home venture" 9 by transfer-
ring greater control of @Home to themselves.' 20 Previously, one of
either Cox or Comcast was required to approve certain board actions.
Following TCI's failure to meet the rollout requirements, all board
actions had to be approved by both Cox and Comcast. This change
gave Cox and Comcast, two minority shareholders, decisive voices in
the management of @Home. Cox and Comcast also negotiated abso-
lute subscriber targets for TCI, which at that point was a subsidiary
of AT&T. According to that new agreement, TCI/AT&T had to sign
up 250,000 new subscribers within one year or else transfer a pre-
scribed percentage of@Home stock to Cox and Comcast for every sub-
scriber below 250,000.121 This ambitious target represented a more
than 300% increase over TCI/AT&T's 1999 subscriber numbers.'
22
TCI/AT&T failed to meet its new subscriber targets in January
2000, at which point Cox and Comcast forced a second negotiation.
123
In this negotiation, Cox and Comcast essentially obtained a guaran-
tee from TCJIAT&T that the value of @Home would increase by ap-
proximately 33% within one year. The guarantee took the form of a
118. At Home Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Apr. 8, 1999).
119. Id.
120. At Home Corp., Notice and Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 26 (May 26,
2000).
121. At Home Corp., General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership
(Form SC 13D/A) (May 31, 2000). AT&T completed its acquisition of TCI in March
1999. As a condition of the agreement, AT&T agreed not to change any members of
the board of @Home until at least one year following the closing of the transaction so
as not to implicate change in control provisions under the MDA that could trigger an
end to Cox and Comcast exclusivity. See AT&T Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(Mar. 9, 1999).
122. At Home Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K405) (Mar. 30. 2000).
123. The result of this second negotiation was an amended distribution agreement
that restructured the relationships among TCI/AT&T, Cox, Comcast, and @Home. At
Home Corp., Amended General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial Ownership
(Form SC 13D/A) (Mar. 30, 2000).
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put option exercisable at a 33% premium to the market price at the
time of the negotiation. 124 In exchange for this guarantee, Cox and
Comcast relinquished control over all governance matters. 125 In ad-
dition, Cox and Comcast terminated their exclusive relationship with
@Home.
126
By January 11, 2001, @Home's stock price had dropped to $7.72,
far below the $48 exercise price of the put option. Cox and Comcast
accordingly exercised their puts for approximately $2.9 billion, paya-
ble in AT&T stock, and formally ended their participation as share-
holders in @Home. 127 TCI/AT&T was left holding 34% of the
economic stake and more than 70% of the voting power in @Home.128
In August 2001, Cox and Comcast notified @Home that they would
terminate their non-exclusive distribution agreement with @Home
effective June 4, 2002, moving their subscribers to their own net-
works and leaving TCI/AT&T as @Home's largest customer. 29 In
December 2001, @Home, by then in bankruptcy, attempted to force a
renegotiation of TCI/AT&T's access to the network. TCI/AT&T re-
fused to negotiate and quickly moved all its subscribers to its own
network.' 30 Following TCI/AT&T's departure, @Home was left with
no subscriber base and virtually worthless network assets. @Home
liquidated at the end of February 2002.131
VII. CONCLUSION
@Home's experience illustrates both the value and the limita-
tions of transactional responses to asset specificity. @Home used con-
tractual safeguards and transactional structures that it hoped would
124. Floyd Norris, AT&T in Deal to Avoid More At Home Stock, N.Y. TIMEs, May
21, 2001, at C12.
125. At Home Corp., Amended General Statement of Acquisition of Beneficial
Ownership (Form SC 13D/A) (Jan. 12, 2001).
126. At Home Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 64 (April 2, 2001). In conjunc-
tion with terminating the exclusivity provisions, @Home agreed to transfer ownership
of certain RDCs within Cox and Comeast clusters to the respective companies to facil-
itate their pursuing alternate high speed access options. At Home Corp., Current
Report (Form 8-K), Ex. 99.01 at 6 (April 3, 2000).
127. At Home Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Apr. 8, 1999).
128. Norris, supra note 124, at C12.
129. Cox and Comcast took slightly longer to replace the @Home network. They
signed transition agreements with @Home that maintained their service until Febru-
ary 28, 2002, when they replaced @Home with their own networks. See Wallack,
supra note 3, at E-1; At Home Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 8, 1999).
130. An AT&T spokesman said that AT&T simply treated its TCI subsidiary as an
internal customer for its networking services and created a private backbone and
caching service for it. See Konrad et al., supra note 3.
131. Id.
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tie the rival cable companies together in spite of incentives for each to
act opportunistically. The parties hoped that a valuable network,
combined with joint ownership and an exclusivity obligation, would
build a self-enforcing long-term dependency on @Home. Lock-in,
however, never occurred because rapid change in the industry made
it impossible for @Home to create a network that was more valuable
than substitutes available on the market.
Fast developments in the Internet from 1995 to 2000 largely
erased the advantage that a jointly-owned network might have had
over the next-best alternative. As the marketplace changed, the part-
ners found that they could efficiently replicate many, if not all, of the
services of the @Home network on their own.
The experience of @Home provides two lessons. First, ex ante
incentives matter. Parties can use contractual and deal structures to
create credible incentives that overcome the problems of asset speci-
ficity and coordinate complex, multiparty investments of the type re-
quired to build out the @Home network. This was no small feat. Had
parties approached the creation of @Home in a more conventional
manner (e.g., reliance on long-term supply contracts with third-party
cable companies), @Home might have avoided its ultimate fate in the
short term. However, it likely would have faced greater obstacles to
adoption of the technology and the service. The structure developed
by the parties helped to successfully coordinate complex investments
in specific assets and created incentives for the broad-based adoption
of cable-based Internet access.
The second lesson from the @Home story is less sanguine. When
markets are subject to rapid post-contractual change, parties cannot
rely entirely on transactional structures like lock-in. Rather, they
may need to rely more heavily on long-term supply contracts notwith-
standing the vulnerabilities of such a strategy. Had TCI, Cox, and
Comcast relied on a longer-term exclusivity arrangement, the @Home
network might have been able to survive for a longer period. Of
course, where underlying conditions - including technology - are
changing rapidly, parties will rightly hesitate to enter into long-term
commitments that might become obsolete almost immediately upon
signing. This leaves parties, like the parties in @Home, in a dilemma
for which it remains difficult to come up with a perfect solution.
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